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Abstract
This paper analyses votes cast in the Eurovision Song Contest in the period
1975 − 2003. We test whether accusations of ‘political’ voting among partici-
pants can be substantiated by looking at geographical influences. Our approach
differs in two ways from earlier studies. First, we take into account a variety
of variables to distinguish political voting from preferences based on cultural,
linguistic, ethnic, and religious differences and similarities between countries.
Secondly, we analyse the determinants of the voting behaviour separately per
country, instead of looking at average effects over all participating countries. We
find that geographical factors substantially affect the votes. Even after correc-
tion for cultural, linguistic and other factors many countries prefer or dislike the
songs of surrounding countries. This leads to the suspicion that the geograph-
ical preferences reflect political voting. Also, we show that several countries
favour songs of participants with the same religious background, while others
prefer the contributions of countries with a different religion. Moreover, using
data on the amount of Turkish immigrants across European countries, we doc-
ument that countries with a substantial Turkish population favour the Turkish
songs (‘patriotic’ voting). Furthermore, we study the repercussions of opening
up the voting system to the general public by the introduction of televoting. It
turns out that religious and patriotic voting have become considerably stronger
since the introduction of the new voting system. Finally, we confront our em-
pirical findings to the publicly debated accusations of political voting made
against certain blocks of countries. Although our analysis uncovers significant
geographical patterns (suggesting political voting), we do hardly establish any
empirical evidence for the claims against these particular countries.
Keywords: Eurovision Song Contest, voting competition, panel data
AMS Subject Classification: 62P20, 91B12
1 Introduction
The Eurovision Song contest is an annual event in which a large number of countries
compete for the title of ‘best’ Eurovision song. From its small start in 1956 with only
seven participants, it has grown into a huge entertainment spectacle with about
hundred million viewers in 2005.
Since the winner of the Eurovision Song Contest is determined by a scoring
system based on votes given by the participating countries themselves, suspicions
and accusations of ‘tactical’ and ‘political’ voting are as old as the song contest
itself. That there is some systematic ‘bias’ in Eurovision Contest voting can hardly
be doubted when considering e.g. the points assigned by Cyprus and Greece to each
other. In the period 1993 − 2003 Cyprus and Greece gave each other the maximal
number of points in virtually all years.
However, even for this convincing example we should not forget that before
making a claim about ‘unfair’ voting patterns, we should consider at least two ex-
tra factors. First, cultural and linguistic similarities and differences may result in a
common musical taste leading to a strong preference for particular countries’ songs.
Therefore, awarding a relatively high number of points to a certain country through-
out the years does not necessarily have to be purely ‘political’ behaviour. Secondly,
voting bias is a relative phenomenon. In 1992 Greece became 5th out of 23 with
only 8 countries giving zero points, while in 2003 it became 17th out of 26, with
19 countries giving zero points. It seems natural to consider the 12 points awarded
to Greece by Cyprus in 2003 as a stronger indication for a bias than the 12 points
awarded in 1992.
In this paper we investigate in detail whether the suspected voting political biases
exist by looking at geographical influences. In contrast to the existing literature
(see e.g. Ginsburgh & Noury (2004) and Haan, Dijkstra & Dijkstra (2005)), we
take the view that the voting bias towards certain songs may differ significantly
among the participants due to differences in the above factors. The often heard
accusations that there are systematic biases in votes usually focus on a few countries.
Therefore, it is important to examine such hypotheses on an individual basis, i.e.
per country. Additionally, we introduce a variety of variables to distinguish political
voting from preferences based on cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and religious differences
and similarities between countries.
We establish the following results. Geographical factors strongly affect the vot-
ing behaviour of the countries that participate in the Eurovision Song Contest. Even
after correction for cultural, linguistic, and other factors, many countries prefer or
dislike the songs of neighbouring countries or other countries close by. Hence, the
preference of these countries for the songs of surrounding countries cannot be ex-
plained by e.g. linguistic and cultural similarities. This gives rise to the suspicion
that the geographical effects reflect ‘political’ voting, as it is difficult to think of any
other reasons why countries would show such behaviour. Furthermore, we establish
significant evidence for ‘religious’ voting. That is, some countries favour songs of par-
ticipants with the same religious background, while others prefer the contributions
of countries with a different religion. Moreover, we show that also ethnicity plays a
role in explaining the voting bias. Using data on the amount of Turkish immigrants
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across European countries, we find that the countries with a substantial Turkish
population clearly favour the Turkish songs. We refer to this as ‘patriotic’ voting.
Additionally, we show that religious and patriotic voting have become considerably
stronger since the introduction of televoting in 1997/1998. Finally, we confront our
findings to some publicly debated accusations of political voting addressed to cer-
tain blocks of countries, including e.g. the Baltic states, the former Republic of
Yugoslavia, Scandinavia, and Greece and Cyprus. Although our results uncover sig-
nificant geographical patterns in the voting biases (suggesting political voting), the
accusations of political voting against these groups of countries are hardly supported
by empirical evidence. For example, the huge bias between Cyprus and Greece can
be explained for a significant part by the common language and a common religious
background.
The setup of this paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses some earlier
studies dealing with the Eurovision Song Contest. Section 3 explains the rules of the
contest and the data set used in this paper. In Section 4 we describe the variables
that potentially affect the voting bias. Also, we provide some sample statistics as
preliminary evidence that these variables do indeed play a role. This leads us to
Section 5, where we describe the panel data model that explains the voting bias from
several determinants. Next, Section 6 discuss the estimation results and Section 7
investigates the robustness of the estimation results. In Section 8 we consider some
frequently debated accusations of political voting in the light of our empirical results.
Finally, Section 9 concludes.
2 Literature review
There is an extensive amount of information available on the Eurovision Song Con-
test, varying from detailed web sites containing data to academic publications. In
this section we discuss some important contributions to the latter category.
Fenn, Suleman, Efstathiou & Johnson (2005) study the voting patterns in the
Eurovision Song Contest by means of a network approach. For every year of the
contest, they construct a graph with all participating countries as nodes. There
is an arrow from country A to country B, if country A awards points to country
B. The actual number of points does not play a role here. The resulting graph is
compared to a random graph in terms of a quantity called the ‘clustering coefficient’.
This coefficient measures the probability that two countries awarding points to a
particular song, also award points to each other. For the years 1992 − 2003, the
clustering coefficient for the graphs based on the voting results is always larger
than the clustering coefficient in equivalent random graphs. This suggests what the
authors call ‘voting cliques’.
In the same paper, cluster analysis is used to show which countries behave sim-
ilarly in terms of the average number of points awarded to other countries.1 The
results suggest some correlation between countries’ voting patterns based on geo-
graphical proximity. But, there are some important exceptions to this rule as well.
For example, Spain is not included in a cluster containing France and Portugal, and
1The authors assume that countries assign a virtual 14 points to themselves.
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there is no correlation between Cyprus and Turkey although they are geographically
very close. The authors conclude that the observed voting similarities arise for more
subtle reasons, such as a common historical or cultural background, instead of just
geographical proximity. This is exactly the hypothesis we will test in more detail in
the present paper. In this sense, part of our study can be seen as an extension of
Fenn et al. (2005).
For the period 1956 − 1997, Haan et al. (2005) explain the final ranking of
the songs participating in the Eurovision Song Contest from various performance
features, the order of performance, and the host country. They show that the expert
juries (that gave points to the songs until 1996) are better judges than the public
(that judges the finals since the introduction of televoting in 1997). The juries are
better judges in the sense that the ranking of the songs judged by them is less
sensitive to factors unrelated to song quality. However, the authors also show that
expert judgement is not perfect and still depends on such factors.
Ginsburgh & Noury (2004) provide the most detailed statistical analysis per-
formed so far upon the Eurovision Song contest votes. The authors distinguish ‘tac-
tical voting’ (where two countries exchange votes) and ‘cultural voting’ (where coun-
tries prefer songs from those countries which satisfy certain cultural characteristics).
To do so, they define a model to explain the number of points given from a country
i to a different country j from the number of points given by j to i, as well as some
other variables. These remaining variables represent linguistic differences (based on
the distances between languages as formulated and measured by Dyen, Kruskal &
Black (1992)), performance features (such as the gender of the lead singer, compo-
sition of the performing group, order of performance, and whether the performers
are from the country hosting that year’s contest), and cultural differences based on
Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (see Hofstede (1980) and Hofstede (1996)). For
the period 1975 − 2003, Ginsburgh & Noury (2004) test the hypothesis that votes
have been exchanged in the contest. The authors find hardly any evidence for this
hypothesis. By contrast, song ‘quality’ plays a substantial role in explaining the vot-
ing behaviour. Moreover, cultural variables such as language and Hofstede’s cultural
dimensions turn out significant in most of their models. The authors conclude that
what looks as strategic voting in the Eurovision Song Contest at first sight, may in
fact be sincere voting based on linguistic and cultural similarities.
3 Definitions and data
This section discusses the rules for the Eurovision Song Contest and the data selected
for our analysis. Throughout, we take the data from various Eurovision Song Contest
web sites.2
3.1 Rules of the contest
The rules for the Eurovision Song Contest are relatively simple. Each participating
country contributes a song that has not been released commercially before with a
2See http://www.eurovisioncontest.co.uk and http://members.fortunecity.com/mcdeil69/1980.htm.
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duration less than three minutes. If the song is performed by a group, there can
be at most six people in it. Performers can sing in any language nowadays, even
in a nonexistent language.3 However, from 1966 until 1972 and again from 1978
until 1998 songs were required to be performed in one of a country’s official national
languages. Each country ranks all the entries and assigns twelve points to their
favourite entry, ten points to their second favourite entry, and eight through one
points to their third through tenth favourites. Obviously, countries are not allowed
to vote for themselves. The number of participants has always been more than 20 in
recent years, so each jury assigns zero points to many countries under this system.
Voting takes place after all songs have been performed, and the country with the
highest number of points wins.
Since 1997 (partially) and 1998 (fully) points are awarded by televoting instead
of professional juries in virtually all countries.
3.2 Selection of years
The scoring system by which each song can earn 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8, 10 or 12 points was
introduced in 1975. Since 2004 a semi-final has been organised every year before the
main competition, which partially determines which countries are going to partici-
pate during the main event. This semi-final was introduced to allow a larger number
of countries to participate in the contest. We only use the years 1975− 2003 (inclu-
sive) in our analysis, a period during which the voting rules have hardly changed.
The only major change in this period is the introduction of televoting in 1997/1998,
when voting by telephone replaced the professional juries. We discuss the influence
of televoting extensively in Section 7.2.
3.3 Selection of countries
We consider all countries that have participated at least three times in the period
1975 − 2003. These can be found in the first column of Table 1, together with the
number of years in which each country participated (‘# years’) and the total number
of votes assigned per country (‘# votes’). The total number of votes given by all
countries during the years considered amounts to 13, 014 votes. Note that, after
the breakup of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Macedonia are
treated as separate countries.
Not every country will be present each year, causing the data to be ‘unbalanced’.
When the performance of a country would be strongly positively (negatively) cor-
related to its performance in the previous year, the set of participating countries in
a year would only consist of the ‘good’ (‘bad’) performers. The missing countries
would then represent the ‘bad’ (‘good’) performers, which could give rise to a selec-
tion bias (see Heckman (2003)). In Section 5.1 we will therefore explicitly investigate
the potential selection bias.
3Belgium chose to do so in 2003.
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4 Explaining the voting bias
This section addresses the geographical, cultural, linguistic, and religious factors
that potentially affect the bias in the voting behaviour. Moreover, we provide some
sample statistics as preliminary evidence that these factors are indeed expected to
be relevant.
4.1 Bias
We start by defining the concept of ‘bias’. Let Tij be the number of years in which
both countries i and j participate. Moreover, let ntij be the number of countries
participating in year t, exclusive of countries i and j themselves, and stij the points
of jury i awarded to song j in year t. If country i or j does not participate in year
t, the value of stij equals zero. The average bias of jury i towards song j (denoted
by bij) is calculated as the time-average of the bias over those years in which both
countries participate. The bias btij , in turn, is defined as the difference between the
points of jury i to song j and the average number of points assigned by the other
juries to song j (stij − qtij). More precisely,
bij =
1
Tij
∑
t
btij , (4.1)
btij = stij − qtij , (4.2)
qtij =
1
ntij
∑
k 6=i
stkj . (4.3)
When we interpret the average number of points assigned by the other juries to
song j (qtij) as a proxy for song ‘quality’, a large bias refers to an overvaluation and
a small bias to an undervaluation of a song. Hence, when the number of points jury
i assigns to song j is high, this does not necessarily mean that the bias of the jury
is also high. This depends on the quality of the song; i.e. on the average number of
points assigned to the song by the other juries.
4.2 Geographical influences
In contrast to earlier studies, we explicitly consider variables related to the geograph-
ical position of a country. We include such variables to account for the often voiced
suspicion that these affect the votes. Most of the claims in this direction suggest
that either countries which are close to each other tend to award each other a dis-
proportionately high number of points, or that a block of ‘West-European’ countries
and a block of ‘East-European’ countries tend to favour countries within their own
block.
To investigate these hypotheses, we define several geographical variables. We take
the longitude and latitude of the participating countries’ capitals and define, for any
receiving country j to the west of the awarding country i, the variable ‘xwestij ’ as the
distance between country i’s longitude and country j’s longitude (for countries to the
east of i it is zero). For any receiving country j to the east of awarding country i, we
define ‘xeastij ’ similarly, i.e. as the distance between country i’s longitude and country
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j’s longitude (for countries to the west of country i is zero). We do the same for the
latitudes, resulting in the variables ‘ysouthij ’ and ‘y
north
ij ’. These definitions will allow
us to detect a tendency to award more points to countries that are close, but also a
tendency to vote for countries that are more in the East or in the West. Obviously,
for some countries these variables become redundant. For example, from Iceland’s
point of view, all other countries are located to the east. If this is the case for a
particular country, we only consider a distance variable that does not distinguish
between directions.4 We also define a dummy variable ‘neighbij ’ to indicate whether
two countries share a border on land.5 This variable is redundant in some cases,
for instance for islands and for countries which neigbours do not participate in the
contest when they do.6
Table 1 displays a list of countries (column with caption ‘country’). The columns
with the caption ‘min bias from’ and ‘max bias from’ contain the names of the juries
that are most negatively and most positively biased towards the countries in the
first column, respectively. Table 1 points out an important role for neighbouring
countries. Hence, some first confirmation of the claim that geographical position
matters is found. The Netherlands favour Belgium, Norway favours Sweden, Ger-
many favours Poland, Estonia favours Latvia, Lithuania favours Latvia, and Slovenia
favours Croatia. Similar effects appear for countries that are not neighbours, but lo-
cated relatively close to each other. For instance, Finland favours Estonia and Bosnia
favours Slovenia. By contrast, France dislikes Monaco’s contributions and Hungary
dislikes Croatia’s performances. Even stronger evidence for the relevance of geogra-
phy is given by the pairs of countries (either neighbours or located relatively close
to each other) that show a mutual preference for each other, such as Lithuania and
Latvia, Estonia and Finland, Romania and Macedonia, and Croatia and Macedonia.
A more detailed overview of the average biases of individual jury countries to
song countries over the years reveals even more geographical patterns (see Tables 2
and 3). Although the latter tables, as well as Table 1, do not provide direct evidence
for a confrontation between Eastern and Western Europe, some grouping is clearly
visible. Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Iceland) are highly pos-
itively biased towards each other. Other countries with a positive bias are the former
Yugoslavian countries, Finland and the Baltic states, and Greece and Cyprus.
Obviously, we wish to uncover ‘pure’ geographical effects rather than linguistic
and cultural similarities and differences that could account for geographical pat-
terns. In the formal analysis in Section 6.1 we will be able to distinguish genuine
geographical preferences by correcting for a wide range of other factors.
4.3 Religion
The role of religion in the Eurovision Song Contest was publicly discussed after
the 2005 contest won by Greece. The runner up Malta then claimed that there
was a strong bias towards Greece from other Orthodox countries.7 Moreover, recent
4We do this for Iceland, Israel, and Russia
5We do not define neighbours over sea.
6This is the case for Cyprus, Malta, Iceland, Israel, and Yugoslavia.
7See http://www.eurosong.nl/NieuwsDetailUK.aspx?ID=246&Artiest=102&Landcode=MA.
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studies in the field of behavioural economics point out that religion often affects the
decisions of economic agents (see e.g. Iannaccone (1995), Iannaccone (1998), and
Kuran (1994)), providing additional motivation to assess the impact of religion on
the voting behaviour.
We define dummy variables ‘relij ’, which are one if and only if the voting coun-
try i and the performing country j share a major religion. A religion in a country
is taken into account if the percentage of people adhering to this religion is either
the largest among all religions, or if it is second largest with at least 20% adher-
ence. We make this particular choice to allow for more than one major religion in
a country, but only if it is substantial. Moreover, we take a 20% threshold level,
since most countries under consideration have about five major religions. We dis-
tinguish the religions Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, and Protestant
(covering Lutheran, Calvinist, Reformed, Anglican, and all other non-Catholic and
non-Orthodox Christian varieties). We use the information provided in the CIA
Factbook8 to determine the major religions for each country under consideration.
We do not use the percentages for the different religious groups as explanatory vari-
ables, since they fluctuate over the years. By contrast, the aforementioned dummy
variable is much more stable over the years.
Finally, we notice that the inclusion of a variable accounting for religion should
not be interpreted as an effort to explain musical tastes by religious preferences.
We merely identify common characteristics between different countries that poten-
tially explain the preferences observed in the Eurovision Song Contest votes. Also,
although many European countries are highly secularised, religion may still be a
factor of importance. It may reflect certain cultural characteristics of a country that
have been established over the centuries and do not necessarily disappear when the
role of religion becomes less prominent.
4.4 Ethnicity
Since reliable migration figures are hard to find, we only look at the specific case
of Turkey, for which reliable migration data are widely available. The 2004’s final
Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey gives an overview of countries
with a substantial Turkish population. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom all have a Turkish
population of 37.000 persons or more, see Turkey in Europe: More than a Promise?
(2004). The first generation of this Turkish population came to Europe as migrant
workers in the sixties.
We do not use scaled versions of population numbers as explanatory variables,
since these vary considerably over time. Instead, we use a dummy variable ‘turkpopi’
for each country. This dummy equals one if a country has a large Turkish population
and is zero otherwise.
Table 4 provides some first evidence for ‘patriotic’ voting. We see that, since
televoting took over from the professional juries in 1997/1998, some of the afore-
mentioned countries (most notably France, Germany, and the Netherlands) have
8See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2122.html
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started to assign many points to the Turkish contribution. Table 4 also points out
that the effect of Turkish migration was much weaker when the voting was still in the
hands of professional juries. We mention that we obtain virtually the same results
when we take the year 1997 (instead of 1998) as the start of the televoting period.
4.5 Linguistic, cultural & performance variables
We follow the idea of Ginsburgh & Noury (2004) and use the distances between
the awarding and receiving countries’ languages as an explanatory variable in our
analysis. Hence, we use the results of the study of Dyen et al. (1992) on lexicosta-
tistical distances to measure these distances on a scale from zero (closest) to one
(most distant). A few languages are missing in the study of Dyen et al. (1992), such
as Hungarian, Estonian, Finnish, Hebrew, Maltese, Turkish, and some of the lan-
guages from the former Republic of Yugoslavia. Therefore, we need to make some
assumptions for these languages.9 For almost all jury countries we define a unique
standard language. For those countries that have more than one official language, we
define the linguistic distance to a song’s language as the minimum of the individual
distances for every one of its official languages. Another difference with the earlier
study is that we do not use the title of a song to define the song’s language but the
actual text sung, since these differ in many cases. When a song contains more than
one language, we take the language of the refrain. We use the notation ‘langtij ’ to
indicate the linguistic distance between the jury of country i and the song of country
j in year t.
The dummy variables that we use for the features defining the characteristics of
the songs speak for themselves. They characterise the song as being sung in English
or French (dummies ‘englishtj ’ and ‘frenchtj ’), performed by a solo male (the dummy
‘maletj ’ equals one in this case), a male-female duet (dummy ‘duettj ’), or a group
(dummy ‘grouptj ’). Other variables identify in what order the songs are presented
during the contest (‘ordertj ’) and whether or not the performers represent the host
country in a particular year (dummy ‘hosttj ’). These factors are considered, as there
is some evidence that the order in which performances are viewed influences the
points awarded by the jury, see Flores & Ginsburgh (1996) and Haan et al. (2005).
The gender of the performer may have some influence as well, as shown in Ginsburgh
& Van Ours (2003).
We use Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions to capture the cultural differences
among the participating countries. As in Ginsburgh & Noury (2004), we use the
distances between the voting and the receiving countries’ value for a Hofstede di-
9We take the distance of Hebrew, Maltese, and Turkish equal to one to all other languages,
with exception of the distance between Hebrew and Maltese. The distance between Finnish and
Estonian is taken to be 0.439, since the official Estonian language’s web site compares this distance
to another one (German-Persian) that can be found in Dyen et al. (1992). Likewise, the distance
between Hungarian and Finnish was taken to be 0.860, as this distance is claimed to be the same
as between Frisian and English. The distance from Hungarian, Finnish, and Estonian to all other
languages is taken to be one, since these three languages belong to a different language group. We
take Serbian (which is present in Dyen et al. (1992)) to be indicative for Bosnian and Croatian,
as they seem to be the closest languages for which data are available. Belgium used an ‘imaginary
language’ in 2003, which we define to have maximal distance one to all other languages.
8
mension as the explanatory variables. The four Hofstede dimensions are power dis-
tance, individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance, which are denoted by
‘pdiij ’, ‘idvij ’, ‘masij ’, and ‘uaiij ’, respectively.
10 Not all participating countries are
mentioned in Hofstede’s study, so we determine their cultural dimensions by other
methods.11 Even though this may not do complete justice to cultural differences in
a few cases, we assume that these variables will still be able to capture some of the
cultural features of the participating countries.
Since several studies have already analysed the influence of variables such as
language and performance characteristics on the voting behaviour during the Euro-
vision Song Contest, we only briefly illustrate the relevance of these variables for the
current sample in Table 5. Although less than 24% of all songs is in English, they
account for almost 50% of all victories (rows with caption ‘language’). This suggests
that the language of the song plays a role in explaining the voting behaviour. Sim-
ilarly, songs performed by groups obtain more victories than expected on the basis
of group participation (rows with caption ‘performance’). Also the order of perfor-
mance seems to affect the votes (rows with caption ‘order’). Although this order
is drawn randomly each year, some places perform better or worse than expected.
This phenomenon has also been observed in other competitions, see e.g. Ginsburgh
& Van Ours (2003). According to Table 5, the last performer seems to have the
biggest advantage. Finally, the host country also seems to benefit from its position,
given that the percentage of contests won by the host country is substantially larger
than expected (rows with caption ‘host country’).
5 The model
In this section we present a panel data model to explain the voting behaviour of the
participating countries from various determinants.
5.1 Introduction
The votes for the Eurovision Song Contest during the period 1975−2003 constitute a
panel data set in the three dimensions time, juries, and songs. Since not all countries
participate each year, the sample is unbalanced. Given the considerable size and
dimension of the data set (29 years and 36 potentially participating countries leading
to 13, 014 votes) and the large number of explanatory variables, we need a model
that is both realistic and feasible.
Throughout, we take the bias defined by equations (4.2) and (4.3) as the depen-
dent variable. This has the advantage of working with a continuous variable rather
10See http://www.geert-hofstede.com.
11For Yugoslavia and Bosnia Herzehovina we use Hofstede’s values for Serbia as a proxy. Since
only the Greek part of Cyprus participates in the contest, we use the same values for Cyprus as for
Greece. For Monaco we use the values reported for France. As we cannot find any values for Latvia
and Malta, we use the average found for all European countries in both cases. Values for Lithuania
and Macedonia are taken from local studies that appeared after Hofstede’s original publications, see
http://www.regent.edu/acad/sls/publications/journals/ijls/new/vol1iss1/mockaitis/cross cultural.pdf
(Lithuania) and http://www.cas.bg/obj/downloads/3 3/Tanya%20-%20final%20project.pdf
(Macedonia).
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than a categorical one, such as the number of points assigned from one country to
another or the final ranking of a song in the contest.12
Our analysis focuses on fixed effects. In contrast to most existing fixed effects
models, we allow both intercepts and slopes to vary per jury country (see e.g. Yaffee
(2003)). We opt for such a specification, since we expect variation in the way the
voting behaviour of different countries is determined by variables such as cultural
and linguistic differences, performance features, and geographical factors. Moreover,
a model with cross-sectional variation in slopes permits formal testing for equality
of slopes.
As mentioned before, a selection bias could be present in the data. Such a bias
would occur when the performance of a country in a particular year is significantly
related to its performance in the previous year. Unfortunately, it is not possible
to do a formal test for selection bias (see Nijman & Verbeek (1992)), since we do
not observe any songs for the countries that do not participate in a particular year.
Therefore, we use an alternative approach. For each country we calculate the first or-
der autocorrelation in the song quality, with song quality defined as in equation (4.3).
Using the Ljung-Box test, we subsequently test for autocorrelation in song quality,
taking a 5% significance level. Fortunately, the results show that there is significant
first-order autocorrelation for one country only, namely for France. Since France
(being one of the sponsors of the event) participates every year in the song contest
independently of its performance in the previous year, the positive autocorrelation
in song quality is not a problem and will not lead to a selection bias. Although this
is not a formal test for selection bias, the insignificant autocorrelations suggest that
the selection effects are limited.
5.2 Fixed effects model
Since our main focus is on the voting behaviour of the participating countries, we
initially ignore any period effects and confine the analysis for the moment to cross-
country effects. Our panel data set consists of the dependent variable btij − the bias
of jury i towards song j in year t − and a corresponding 1×K vector of covariates
Xtij , for t = 1, . . . , T , i = 1, . . . , N , with some missing observations. Here T denotes
the number of years, N the number of countries under consideration, and K the
number of explanatory variables. For the full sample T = 29 and N = 36, while K
varies over different model specifications.
We write the initial fixed-effects model (alternatively referred to as a least-squares
dummy variable model) as
btij = αi +Xtijβi + εtij , IE(εtij | Xtij) = 0, (5.4)
where βi is a column vector of dimension K and αi an intercept. Identification of
the model in equation (5.4) requires certain restrictions on the disturbance terms.
12Also, since the bias represents the difference between a country’s points and the quality of
the song determined by the other countries, we do not need to explain the bias from song quality
anymore. This approach has the advantage that it avoids the problems of circularity and endogeneity
encountered by Ginsburgh & Noury (2004).
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We will discuss them later when we explain the estimation method. We stack btij ,
Xtij and εtij in such a way that we arrive at the more compact specification
bi = αi +Xiβi + εi. (5.5)
This notation emphasises that we consider N cross-sectional equations.
5.3 Model estimation
As long as all intercepts and slopes vary across jury countries, we can the model in
equation (5.5) separately per country using all votes assigned to the other countries
over the years. However, as soon as we impose any cross-country restrictions upon
the coefficients, joint estimation of all country equations is required.
Throughout, we use White (1980)’s robust covariance matrix to correct for (cross-
sectional) heteroskedasticity. When the disturbance terms would additionally feature
cross-sectional correlation, a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) setup would yield
more efficient estimates than pooled estimation. However, the unbalanced sample re-
quires maximum likelihood estimation of the SUR model (rather than per equation
estimation combined with feasible generalised least squares as in the case of an
balanced sample). Because of the large amount of coefficients and the substantial
number of observations, maximum likelihood estimation becomes practically infea-
sible. Therefore, we do not consider the SUR model and assume that there is no
cross-sectional correlation among the residuals.
6 Estimation results
In this section we present the estimation results for several model specifications
that relate the voting bias of the Eurovision countries to several factors, such as
geographical location, religion, ethnicity, culture, and religion.
First, we estimate a model with country-specific slopes, allowing all explanatory
variables to affect the voting bias of each country in a different way. We refer to this
specification as the ‘country-specific’ model. In the second model that we consider,
each variable has equal coefficients across countries (i.e. βi = β, all i) but possibly
different intercepts. We refer to this as the model with constant slopes. In the latter
case the model coefficients measure the ‘average’ effects of the explanatory variables
over all countries under consideration.
6.1 Geographical factors
The sample statistics in Section 4.2 suggest that the voting behaviour of European
countries contains a strong geographical factor. To test this in a more formal way, we
estimate, for each country, the model of equation (5.5). The full list of explanatory
variables contained in the vector Xtij is provided in Table 6.
The estimation results in Table 7 show that the voting biases of 15 out of 36
countries are significantly affected by their distance to other countries. As motivated
in Section 4.2, we distinguish between horizontal and vertical distance (measured
between country capitals), as well direction (north, east, south, west; also based on
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capitals). Regarding horizontal distance, the bias in the votes to countries close by is
generally higher than to countries that are located further away (with Luxembourg
and Slovakia as the exceptions). Juries do not show a clear preference for songs
coming from, geographically speaking, more western or eastern countries. The num-
ber of juries that significantly dislike songs from countries to their west is virtually
the same as the number of countries that dislikes contributions coming from their
east. Moreover, some juries have a higher voting bias towards all countries close by,
independently of the direction (see Germany, Macedonia, and Turkey). Very differ-
ent results are established for the effects of the vertical distances between capitals.
Among the juries for which the vertical distance significantly affects the bias, coun-
tries generally show higher biases towards countries that are located relatively far
way in a vertical sense (with exception of Bosnia, Finland, and Slovakia). Again,
juries show no particular preference for countries that are, in geographical terms,
more to their north or south.
Furthermore, for six out of 36 countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Slovakia, and Switzerland) the voting bias to neighbouring countries is significantly
higher than to other countries, while for two countries (Austria and Macedonia) it is
significantly lower. For the remaining 31 countries, there are no significant neighbour
effects.
The geographical variables highlight some interesting results. For all three Baltic
states the neighbour dummy is highly significant. The distance variables that are
significant for Estonia confirm this picture. Furthermore, for Slovenia, and Mace-
donia − both part of the former Republic of Yugoslavia − neighbour and distance
effects also play a significant role. These findings confirm the results of the prelim-
inary data analysis in Section 4, which suggested that the Baltic states and the
formerly Yugoslavian countries constitute blocks in which the constituting countries
are strongly biased towards each other. However, we now additionally show that
these biases exist even after correction for cultural and linguistic similarities and
differences, and performance features.
The results show that many countries either prefer or dislike the songs of sur-
rounding countries, even after correction for linguistic, cultural, and other factors.
This gives rise to the suspicion that political factors account for the observed geo-
graphical effects, as it is difficult to think of any other reasons why countries would
show such behaviour. Nevertheless, we emphasise that it is still possible that we have
omitted some important explanatory variables which, when included in the regres-
sion, would become highly significant and would cause the distance and neighbour
variables to turn out insignificant.
We assess the ‘average’ impact of the geographical variables on the voting bias by
means of the constant slopes model. The lower panel of Table 7 (‘equal slopes (entire
period)’) shows that the average neighbour effect is insignificant. However, distance
effects do play a role in the model with constant slopes. On average, juries favour
countries closer by in terms of horizontal distance, but at the same time, they favour
countries further away to the south. Clearly, these results do not provide sufficient
evidence for a ‘battle’ between Eastern and Western Europe as is often suggested.
Nevertheless, on average juries favour countries located on the same geographical
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width. This means that western (eastern) countries are positively biased towards
other western (eastern) countries.
6.2 Religion
The estimation results in Table 9 show that religion significantly influences the voting
bias of five countries. Interestingly, religion plays a significant role for some countries,
even after the correction for cultural and linguistic similarities and differences.
Bosnia favours countries it does not share a main religion with, while Cyprus,
Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, and the United Kingdom show opposite behaviour. These
countries favour countries with the same religion. The countries Bosnia, Macedonia,
and Turkey in which the Islam is one of the major religions do note show significant
preferences based on religion (Macedonia and Turkey) or show a significant prefer-
ence for non-Muslim countries (Bosnia). The significant role of religion in the voting
behaviour of Cyprus and Ireland does not come as a complete surprise. Ireland is
known as a deeply Catholic nation, whereas Cyprus has a strong Orthodox tradi-
tion. For Latvia and Iceland, both predominantly protestant (Lutheran) countries,
the impact of religion is more difficult to explain. The same difficulty arises for the
United Kingdom where the Anglican Church represents the main religion.13
Religion also turns out significantly positive in the model with constant slopes.
See the lower panel of Table 9 (‘equal slopes (entire period)’). This means that, on
average, countries are positively biased towards countries with the same religious
background.
6.3 Ethnicity
The sample statistics in Section 4.4 suggest that countries with a substantial Turkish
population are strongly biased towards the Turkish contribution to the song contest.
To make this more precise, we extend the collection of covariates with the dummy
variable for Turkish nationality introduced in Section 4.4. By doing so, we obtain a
first impression of the effects of ethnicity on the voting behaviour of the Eurovision
participants. We include the dummy variable for Turkish migration in the model of
equation (5.5), assuming that the impact of this variable on the bias to the Turkish
contribution does not depend on the voting country. Since the dummy variable does
only vary over jury countries and not over time or song countries, we have to impose
this restriction for the purpose of identification. This also means that we cannot
estimate the resulting equations separately for individual countries, but instead have
to rely on joint estimation of the panel model for all countries. The estimation results
show that the countries with a substantial population with Turkish roots have a
significantly higher voting bias towards Turkey. We refer to this phenomenon as
‘patriotic’ voting. The estimated coefficient of the Turkish migration dummy has a
value of 0.61, with a corresponding t-value of 2.49. To save space we do not report
the estimation results for the other coefficients in the model, but we notice that
13We do not include the religion dummy in the equation for Israel, since this country is the only
country with Judaism as major religion.
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they are very similar to the ones obtained in the previous model without a role for
Turkish nationality.14
The Turkish migration dummy is also significant positively in the model with
constant slopes. Its coefficient has a value of 0.95 and corresponding t-value 4.55.
This means that, on average, the votes of countries with Turkish immigrants are
positively biased towards Turkey. Again, we do not report the full estimation results
for the model with constant slopes, as they are very similar to the ones reported in
the lower panel of Tables 7, 8, and 9 (‘equal slopes (entire period)’).15
6.4 Language, culture, and other variables
For the remaining variables the estimation results for the model with constant slopes
seem to confirm the results of earlier studies. The last rows of Tables 7, 8, and 9
point out that, on average, juries have significantly higher biases towards songs in a
related language and to songs coming from a similar culture.16 Also, on average juries
significantly dislike songs sung in French. No significant effects are established for the
performance features and the Hofstede dimensions of individualism and uncertainty
avoidance. The effects of the host country and the order of performance are not
significant either.17
However, the estimation results in Tables 7, 8, and 9 also make clear that there
are considerable differences across countries. For instance, some juries favour songs
coming from a culture that substantially differs from their own in terms of one or
more Hofstede dimensions (e.g. Portugal with individualism). Also, some variables
that on average do not exert a significant effect on the bias, significantly influence
the bias of individual countries (the duet, group, and male dummy variables, as well
as the dummy for songs sung in English). Hence, the model with constant slopes
might suggest that a variable does not play a significant role in explaining the bias,
since positive and negative effects of this variable cancel out when they are averaged
over all countries. By contrast, in the country-specific model these variables can turn
out to significantly affect the bias of several countries.
The substantial difference in the adjusted ‘overall’ R2 between the model with
constant slopes (0.022) and the country-specific model (0.073) also underlines the
importance of taking into account the differences among the various countries.18 A
formal Wald test provides more evidence in favour of the country-specific model.
The constant-slope model is rejected in favour of the country-specific model at a 5%
significance level. Additionally, for every explanatory variable the null hypothesis of
14These results are available from the authors upon request.
15These results are also upon request.
16We notice that we do not include the language distance variable in the models for Israel, Turkey,
Hungary, Finland, and Estonia, since the languages of these countries have distance one to virtually
all other countries.
17We notice that we use normalised distances and performance order variables in the regression.
We normalise the distances from a country to another country by dividing it by the maximum
distance from the former country to the latter countries; we normalise the performance order variable
by dividing it by the total number of participating countries in that year.
18The overall adjusted R2 corresponds to the entire system of country equations and represents
the average of the adjusted R2’s over all countries under consideration.
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similar coefficients across countries is rejected at the same significance level. This
does not only hold for the variables related to linguistic and cultural differences and
the performance features, but for all explanatory variables included in the specifi-
cation. Tables 7, 8, and 9 show that the group of variables with the highest relative
R2 are also the ones that turn out significant for the largest number of countries,
which emphasises once more their importance.
7 Model robustness
In this section we extend the analysis of the previous section to answer three fun-
damental questions. First, we assess the relative importance of each of the variable
groups that affects the voting bias. Second, by analysing the extent to which the
voting bias of a particular country depends on the covariates, we determine whether
the bias is ‘structural’ or not. Finally, we investigate the influence of televoting on
the voting behaviour.
7.1 Relative importance of variables
The estimation results point out that many variables significantly affect the voting
bias. To gain more insight into the relative importance of each variable group, we run
the regression model in equation (5.5) but leave out one of the variable groups while
maintaining the others. The variable groups considered are language, culture (i.e.
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions), performance features, geographical variables, order
of performance, and host country. As a measure for the relevance of each variable
group, we take the difference between the adjusted overall R2 of the full model and
the model without one particular variable group (the ‘reduced’ model). The larger
this difference, the more relevant a particular group of variables. The estimation
results show that the group of language variables is most important (adjusted overall
R2 is 79.9% of that of the full model), closely followed by the geographical variables
(82.8%), and the Hofstede cultural dimensions (90.3%). For the other groups of
variables the adjusted R2’s of the reduced model are only marginally different from
the full model. Obviously, these percentages only provide information on the overall
relevance of the various groups of variables and not on the importance for individual
countries.
7.2 The effects of televoting
Since 1998 all participating countries use the system of televoting instead of profes-
sional juries. Existing research on the Eurovision Song Contest points out substantial
differences in the voting behaviour of professional juries and the public; see Haan
et al. (2005).
To assess the robustness of our models, we split up the sample in the periods
1975 − 1997 and 1998 − 2003 and re-estimate the models for both periods.19 A
few countries participate only in the pre-televoting period (Monaco) or solely after
19We note that we obtain virtually the same results when we take the year 1997 (instead of 1998)
as the start of the televoting period.
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the replacement of professional juries (Macedonia and Latvia). For these countries
we obviously cannot identify the impact of televoting. For some other countries
(Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia) the results should be interpreted cautiously,
as one of the two periods consists of few years only. More robust conclusions for
these countries can only be drawn when more data are available. To circumvent this
problem, we only consider the fixed effects model with equal slopes at this point.
That is, we confine the analysis to average effects over the participating countries.
The lower panel in Tables 7, 8, and 9 (‘equal slopes (no televoting)’ and ‘equal
slopes (televoting)’) shows that the distance variables play a significant role in the
pre-televoting period, but are considerably less important after the introduction of
televoting (when only one out of four is significant). Moreover, the preference of
some countries for neighbouring countries is a typical feature of the televoting pe-
riod. In the preceding years juries showed, on average, the opposite behaviour with
a significantly negative bias towards neighbouring countries. Before the introduction
of televoting, the coefficient of the neighbour dummy in the constant slopes model
equals 1.55 (with t-value 5.99), while it equals −0.37 (−2.40) after the introduction
of televoting. Also the effect of religion is most pronounced in the televoting pe-
riod. For the professional juries religion played a much less important role than for
the televoting public. In the period with jury voting, the coefficient of the religion
dummy is not even significant, whereas it equals 0.57 (4.20) in the televoting period.
The role of linguistic similarities and differences between countries is stronger after
the introduction of televoting, whereas cultural differences are significant in both
periods. Furthermore, Turkish migration plays a significant role both before and af-
ter the introduction of televoting. However, the effect in the second period is much
stronger than in the first (coefficients 2.84 (t-value 4.83), respectively 0.44 (2.17)).
Hence, the substantial effect of Turkish migration in the time-invariant model is
mainly due to the televoting period.20 Finally, the role of linguistic similarities and
differences between countries is stronger after the introduction of televoting.
7.3 The bias: more than just noise?
The individual R2’s in Table 9 exhibit substantial variation across countries. For
some countries the adjusted R2’s are very high, while fore other countries they are
close to zero. A low R2 means that variation in the bias cannot be explained from
the variables under consideration. By contrast, when the R2 is high the determinants
considered succeed well in explaining the variation in the bias. Hence, by compar-
ing the adjusted R2’s across countries, we can distinguish two groups of countries.
The first group consists of those characterised by a ‘structural’ bias that is strongly
influenced by the factors we consider. The second group contains those for which
the voting bias mainly consists of unexplainable ‘noise’. When we consider an ad-
justed R2 exceeding 0.10 as ‘high’, we see that the countries from former Yugoslavia,
the Baltic states, the Scandinavian countries (except Norway and Finland), Cyprus
20To save space, we do not report full estimation results for the model including the dummy for
countries with a relatively large Turkish population. We notice that the estimation results for this
model are very similar to the specification that ignores migration. Complete results are available
from the authors upon request.
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and Greece, as well as the Eastern-European countries Poland and Slovakia have
the highest partial R2. Note that, in an earlier stage of our analysis, we have also
encountered these countries; see Section 4.2. In the explorative data analysis these
countries appeared on the basis of their high voting bias to other countries in the
same country block.
Table 9 also shows that there are three countries (Monaco, Romania, and Russia)
which biases are not significantly influences by any of the variables under consid-
eration. Also, the biases of Hungary and Luxembourg is solely determined by its
distance to countries to its east. The bias of France is only determined by the lan-
guage of the song; they dislike songs in English.
8 Political voting: myth or reality?
During virtually all Eurovision Song Contests, there have been accusations that some
countries assign votes according to other criteria than pure merit. These presumed
‘political biases’ have become an important part of the contest’s folklore and there is
a lively public debate concerning such issues. The Wikipedia entries21 for the contest
provide an interesting and easily accessible source for these accusations in the public
domain. On these pages is stated that:
”Some viewers claim that politics and international relations dictate a lot of the voting.
There is little empirical data to back up these claims, however. Anecdotal evidence
does suggest that some regional voting blocks do exist though. Cyprus and Greece have
exchanged maximum points (i.e. Greece gives 12 points to Cyprus and Cyprus gives
12 points to Greece in the same Contest) eight times (1987, 1994, 1997, 1998, 2002,
2003, 2004, 2005) since they first competed together in 1981. (. . . ) Additionally, until
Turkey won the Contest in 2003, Cyprus had never given points to Turkey. (Cyprus
awarded 8 points to Turkey that year). The next year, Turkey awarded a single point
to Cyprus for the first time. The Nordic and Baltic countries are perceived to vote
as a block for each other, although careful scrutiny of the votes doesn’t always bear
this out. (. . . ) Similar patterns have been seen in (among others) the states of the
former Soviet Union, former Yugoslav republics, Ireland and Britain, and the western
Mediterranean. The counterargument to these perceived patterns is that it is natural
for people of similar cultures within Europe, sharing common borders where the TV
and radio stations of a number of countries can be received, and speaking similar
languages, to enjoy similar styles of music. This argument is called into question in
the most recent contests, with many competing countries choosing to sing in English
- the cultural similarities argument is not viable.”
Our analysis allows us to investigate the significance of the sort of voting biases
mentioned in the text above. In particular, suspicions of ‘political voting’ have risen
against countries for which geographical variables significantly influence the voting
behaviour, even after corrections for cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and religious effects.
If we look for example at the Baltic countries, we observe that Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania all tend to give significantly more points to neighbouring countries.
Additionally, Estonia also favours countries which are roughly on the same meridian;
these include Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania.
21Website http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurovision Song Contest, visited on January 5,
2006.
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For the Nordic countries, the pattern is more subtle. If Finland, for example,
would favour the other Nordic countries, we would expected it to prefer countries
to its west, and to dislike those to its south. Neither of those is true, although
the preference for countries to the north boils down to a preference for Iceland (no
other country has a capital to the north of Helsinki). For the other Scandinavian
countries, none of the geographical features turns out to be significant, apart from
Sweden’s preferences for countries to its north. That preference seems to indicate a
preference for other Nordic countries, since only Iceland, Finland and Norway are
to its north according to our definitions. However, the influence seems weak and
one would additionally expect the ‘neighbour variable’ to be significant for Sweden
as well, but it is not. On average, Sweden has a maximal bias towards Iceland in
the period we consider, which explains why it favours countries to its north, but
not its neighbours. In Fenn et al. (2005), Iceland was also included in the ‘cluster’
of Scandinavian countries. Moreover, although Iceland does not seem to belong to
Scandinavia in a geographical sense, it makes part of it from a historical and cultural
point of view. We also note that there are strong indications that culture plays an
important role in the voting of both Norway and Iceland, since some of the Hofstede
dimensions are significant for these countries. On the other hand, the relatively high
explanatory power of the model for the voting bias of Denmark and Sweden seems
to be caused mainly by song characteristics. Also language plays an important role
in all of these countries apart from Iceland, where there is an influence based on
religious background. All this leads us to conclude that biases among the Nordic
countries are not just political, but based on many other influences as well.
For the next region mentioned in the Wikipedia entry, the former states of the
Republic of Yugoslavia, the only significant geographical influences that have been
established are connected to Slovenia and Macedonia. The latter country favours
countries close by in terms of meridians (i.e. countries which are close by to the
west or to the east) and countries that are not its neighbours. Slovenia, on the other
hand, strongly favours neighbours. Interestingly, the only other significant variable
for Macedonia is a rather extreme preference for the host country. However, since
the country participated only three times during the sample period, we should be
careful in interpreting this result.
Possible political voting between the United Kingdom and Ireland cannot be sub-
stantiated by our research. The United Kingdom favours countries to its north, but
also countries to its south. Dublin is north of London, but so are many Scandinavian
countries. We see a preference here of the United Kingdom for Scandinavian coun-
tries, which was also found in the cluster analysis of Fenn et al. (2005). The models
for both the United Kingdom and Ireland have rather low explanatory power com-
pared to other countries. Apart from Hofstede’s ‘power dimension’, only language
effects and religious background make a significant contribution.
The suggestions of bias made in Wikipedia against the Western Mediterranean
countries (Spain and Portugal) cannot be substantiated either. Both countries have
very low explained model variances and the only significant geographical variable of
Portugal indicates that it prefers countries to its south and not Spain.
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Does our analysis point the finger at some other countries than those men-
tioned in Wikipedia? The three countries which are most suspicious according to
our analysis are Estonia, Latvia, Cyprus, and Slovakia. Estonia and Latvia have
been discussed before, but the earlier mentioned case of Cyprus and Greece deserves
further mention as it is probably the most often cited example of Eurovision Song
Contest voting bias. We see that the huge bias between Cyprus and Greece can be
explained for a significant part by the common language and a common religious
background. The language effect is influential for both countries, but the religious
background is only significant for the voting of Cyprus. For both Cyprus and Greece
certain performance features significantly affect the bias. Our analysis shows that
linguistic preferences play an important role for many countries (as was also found
in the earlier study of Ginsburgh & Noury (2004)), but the linguistic effect is by far
the most significant for Cyprus and Greece. Also, Slovakia strongly prefers countries
that are on the same latitude or to its west. At the same time it prefers male singers
and entries that perform early on during the shows.
Some countries for which the bias is extremely hard to explain are Russia, Luxem-
bourg and Germany. The result for Germany is remarkable, since three geographical
variables are significant for this country. Apparently, the explanatory power of these
effects is limited. Russia does not have a single significant variable (incidentally, the
same is true for Monaco and Romania).
An effect that is not mentioned in Wikipedia at all when discussing voting bi-
ases is the introduction of televoting. Our study shows that televoting has signifi-
cantly affected the voting behaviour. Since its introduction, the influence of religious
background has gained importance. Moreover, the influence of foreign nationalities
(tested here for Turkish nationality only), although significant both before and af-
ter this introduction, has become much more pronounced in the latter period. Also
the tendency of countries to favour the songs for neighbouring countries is a typical
property of the televoting period.
9 Conclusions
Suspicions and accusations of tactical and political voting are as old as the Eurovision
Song Contest itself. This paper investigates in detail whether the suspected political
voting biases exist, by looking at geographical influences in the period 1975− 2003.
We take into account a variety of variables to distinguish political voting from pref-
erences based on cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and religious differences and similarities
between countries.
We find that geographical factors substantially affect the voting behaviour in
the Eurovision Song Contest. Even after correction for cultural, linguistic and other
factors, many countries prefer or dislike the songs of neighbouring countries or other
countries close by. This gives rise to the suspicion that the geographical effects reflect
‘political’ voting, as it is difficult to think of any other reasons why countries would
adopt such behaviour.
Also religious background plays a role in explaining the voting bias. Several coun-
tries favour the songs of countries with a similar religious background, while others
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are positively biased towards countries dominated by different religions. Further-
more, using data on the amount of Turkish immigrants across European countries,
we document that countries with a substantial Turkish population favour the Turk-
ish songs (‘patriotic’ voting). Additionally, we show that both patriotic and religious
voting have gained importance after the introduction of televoting in 1997/1998.
Although our study uncovers significant geographical patterns in the voting bi-
ases (suggesting political voting), we do hardly find any evidence for the publicly
debated accusations of political voting against certain countries. For example, ac-
cusations against the Nordic countries cannot be upheld when other influences are
taken into account. The same is true for suggestions of political voting bias for the
United Kingdom and Ireland, or for Spain and Portugal. Moreover, the huge bias
between Cyprus and Greece can be explained for a significant part by the common
language and a common religious background. However, we do conclude that there
is evidence for political voting among the Baltic states.
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country # years # obs. min bias to value min max bias to value max min bias from value min max bias from value max
Austria 26 532 Cyprus -1.87 Poland 3.23 Romania -1.73 Hungary 1.62
Belgium 26 526 Romania -1.88 Latvia 2.17 Malta -1.50 Poland 2.37
Bosnia 9 207 Iceland -2.39 Slovenia 3.58 Lithuania -2.17 Turkey 4.82
Croatia 11 254 Sweden -3.39 Macedonia 5.92 Hungary -3.06 Macedonia 5.78
Cyprus 21 448 Latvia -3.06 Greece 9.22 Bosnia -2.38 Greece 7.73
Denmark 22 450 Italy -2.93 Monaco 4.07 Macedonia -4.59 Iceland 3.81
Estonia 9 208 Italy -4.96 Latvia 5.88 Switzerland -3.20 Italy 8.96
Finland 24 482 Malta -3.10 Estonia 5.66 Belgium -1.14 Estonia 3.84
France 28 579 Monaco -2.04 Portugal 3.06 Malta -2.63 Poland 2.33
Germany 28 574 Yugoslavia -1.67 Poland 3.98 Lithuania -4.04 Spain 1.91
Greece 23 479 Israel -2.04 Cyprus 7.73 Latvia -2.41 Cyprus 9.22
Hungary 4 94 Croatia -3.06 United Kingdom 2.49 Lithuania -5.30 Finland 3.52
Iceland 16 352 Malta -2.17 Denmark 3.81 Romania -2.51 Sweden 3.18
Ireland 27 554 Greece -1.41 Hungary 2.34 Iceland -1.91 Sweden 2.11
Israel 24 491 Italy -2.07 Romania 3.34 Slovakia -7.48 Switzerland 2.22
Italy 17 335 Israel -2.00 Estonia 8.96 Estonia -4.96 Portugal 4.75
Latvia 4 92 Turkey -3.28 Poland 8.39 Romania -4.80 Lithuania 6.08
Lithuania 4 91 Hungary -5.30 Latvia 6.08 Denmark -0.94 Latvia 4.65
Luxembourg 19 366 Cyprus -1.66 Malta 3.08 Switzerland -1.34 Malta 4.71
Macedonia 3 70 Denmark -4.59 Romania 6.82 Iceland -1.32 Romania 7.66
Malta 14 315 France -2.63 Slovakia 6.33 Finland -3.10 Slovakia 6.97
Monaco 5 89 Ireland -1.88 United Kingdom 2.18 France -2.04 Denmark 4.07
Netherlands 25 512 Italy -1.89 Belgium 1.53 Romania -2.62 Israel 2.33
Norway 28 573 Monaco -1.83 Sweden 3.05 Slovakia -4.06 Latvia 2.28
Poland 8 184 Turkey -2.59 Italy 3.39 Cyprus -1.67 Latvia 8.39
Portugal 27 550 Estonia -2.23 Italy 4.75 Slovakia -2.34 France 3.06
Romania 5 118 Latvia -4.80 Macedonia 7.66 Denmark -2.18 Macedonia 6.82
Russia 7 162 Turkey -2.54 Romania 5.86 Slovakia -3.04 Latvia 4.93
Slovakia 3 70 Israel -7.48 Malta 6.97 Austria -0.78 Malta 6.33
Slovenia 9 207 Romania -2.13 Croatia 4.33 Denmark -2.37 Bosnia 3.58
Spain 29 596 Switzerland -1.86 Italy 3.52 Lithuania -2.02 Greece 2.76
Sweden 28 579 Russia -2.27 Iceland 3.18 Croatia -3.39 Denmark 3.54
Switzerland 25 506 Estonia -3.20 Israel 2.22 Spain -1.86 United Kingdom 1.35
Turkey 25 520 Cyprus -2.32 Bosnia 4.82 Latvia -3.28 Macedonia 4.57
United Kingdom 29 596 Italy -2.49 Estonia 1.97 Iceland -2.15 Hungary 2.49
Yugoslavia 13 253 Denmark -2.43 Cyprus 2.81 Portugal -2.08 Turkey 3.85
Table 1: Participating countries, number of participated years, and bias
The first column of this table (‘country’) displays the names of the countries that have participated at least three times in the Eurovision Song Contest in the period 1975− 2003. The second
column (‘# years’) contains the number of participated years for each country. The third column (‘# obs.’) shows the total number of votes assigned by each country in the period under
consideration. The fourth and sixth columns (‘min bias to’ and ‘max bias to’) show the song countries towards which the countries in the first column are most negatively and most positively
biased during the observated period. For instance, Austria has the lowest bias towards Cyprus and the highest bias towards Poland. The eighth and tenth columns (‘min bias from’ and ‘max
bias from’) display the jury countries that are most negatively and most positively biased towards the countries in the first column. For instance, the most negative bias for Austria comes from
Romenia, whereas its most positive bias is from Hungary. The remaining columns (‘value min’ and ‘value max’) show the values of the minimum and maximum bias.
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Austria Belgium Bosnia Croatia Cyprus Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Latvia
Austria - -0.89 2.44 0.17 -1.87 0.62 -0.23 -0.25 0.54 -0.63 -0.79 0.40 0.06 0.85 -0.30 -1.18 1.47
Belgium 0.73 - -1.19 -1.16 -0.44 -0.02 -1.66 -1.14 -0.43 1.22 -1.20 -0.16 -0.19 0.27 -0.21 -1.88 2.17
Bosnia 1.43 -0.20 - 2.63 -2.38 -1.60 -1.24 0.33 0.40 -0.31 -1.53 -1.34 -2.39 0.87 0.61 -0.33 -1.25
Croatia -1.34 -1.34 4.46 - 1.04 -2.04 -2.21 -0.77 -1.23 -0.75 -0.03 0.00 -1.07 -0.84 -0.91 1.76 -3.27
Cyprus 0.02 -0.46 -1.49 0.31 - -0.90 -1.18 -0.18 0.02 -1.15 9.22 -1.83 -0.76 -0.20 -0.78 0.53 -3.06
Denmark 0.90 -0.46 1.86 -2.79 0.57 - 1.34 -0.75 -1.47 1.61 -1.51 -0.92 2.44 0.91 -1.40 -2.93 0.25
Estonia 1.03 0.73 -1.63 -1.56 -1.41 1.03 - 3.84 1.55 -1.48 -1.27 0.74 1.49 0.36 -0.72 -4.96 5.88
Finland -0.80 0.11 -0.46 -1.44 0.62 -0.24 5.66 - -0.13 -0.81 -0.31 3.52 -1.35 -1.56 1.32 3.58 2.32
France -0.47 1.19 0.85 -0.75 -0.64 0.50 -1.28 -0.29 - -0.06 0.50 1.56 -1.66 -1.15 1.82 0.60 -0.92
Germany -0.27 -0.35 -0.14 0.69 -1.05 0.36 0.55 0.10 0.08 - -1.36 0.00 -0.49 -0.24 0.49 -0.70 1.18
Greece 0.81 -0.09 -1.15 0.76 7.73 -0.79 -1.45 1.23 0.11 -2.02 - -1.83 -0.22 -0.29 -2.04 -0.77 0.49
Hungary 1.62 -1.28 -0.76 -3.06 0.44 -1.16 1.04 -0.72 0.15 0.81 -0.80 - -1.46 0.88 -3.05 -1.83 -
Iceland 0.44 -0.67 -1.08 -0.52 0.71 3.81 0.94 1.36 0.48 0.56 -1.31 2.84 - -1.91 -0.40 -2.12 1.10
Ireland 0.63 0.21 -1.08 -0.52 -0.17 0.61 2.19 0.72 0.55 0.42 -1.41 2.34 0.44 - -0.18 0.66 0.40
Israel -0.31 -0.48 -1.67 0.35 0.43 1.02 -1.62 0.98 0.36 -0.66 0.65 -0.16 -0.02 -1.56 - -2.07 0.39
Italy 0.60 -0.21 0.50 -1.20 -0.54 -1.12 8.96 -0.86 1.09 0.48 -0.09 -1.70 0.05 0.39 -2.00 - -
Latvia 0.76 0.70 -1.35 -2.11 1.16 1.80 4.01 -0.95 1.31 1.27 -2.41 - 2.68 1.93 -0.20 - -
Lithuania -1.70 -0.61 -2.17 -1.13 -0.66 -1.60 0.52 -0.78 -0.18 -4.04 -1.63 -5.30 -0.28 0.53 -2.43 - 6.08
Luxembourg -1.13 0.10 -1.17 -1.35 -1.66 -1.01 - -0.49 0.36 -0.16 -0.52 - -0.38 0.11 0.51 -0.44 -
Macedonia -1.36 0.49 1.64 5.78 -0.55 -4.59 -1.60 -0.26 -1.00 -2.96 -0.87 -0.17 -2.05 0.17 -0.03 - -1.86
Malta -0.32 -1.50 0.62 2.96 1.44 -1.07 -0.47 -0.82 -2.63 -0.61 1.21 -1.31 -0.29 0.48 0.60 0.36 -1.96
Monaco 0.97 0.87 - - - -1.01 - 0.67 0.88 1.91 0.83 - - -1.88 -1.23 -0.35 -
Netherlands -0.72 1.53 -1.14 -1.73 0.30 0.50 0.24 0.06 1.06 0.38 0.27 1.09 -0.05 -0.49 0.71 -1.89 -0.99
Norway -0.86 -0.33 -0.55 -0.52 0.19 2.44 -0.02 0.77 0.95 -1.54 -0.05 0.78 1.29 0.57 -0.27 -1.20 1.79
Poland -0.10 2.37 -0.76 -0.87 -1.39 -1.44 2.10 -0.62 2.33 0.98 0.09 2.61 -0.67 -0.29 0.64 3.39 -0.49
Portugal -0.49 0.68 -1.47 0.12 -0.62 -0.62 -2.23 -1.08 -0.05 1.85 -0.03 -1.57 0.47 -0.95 1.11 4.75 -0.49
Romania -1.73 -1.32 -1.46 -0.99 0.77 -4.07 -0.68 0.21 0.26 0.83 2.47 -1.17 -2.51 -0.07 0.58 - -4.80
Russia -1.25 0.43 -1.23 -0.65 -0.25 -0.01 -1.95 -0.80 1.15 1.73 0.10 -0.64 -0.96 -0.42 1.16 2.35 -0.92
Slovakia -0.46 0.48 3.02 5.55 2.81 - 0.74 -0.62 -1.40 -1.00 3.15 -2.74 -1.23 -0.85 -7.48 - -
Slovenia -0.64 -1.07 1.04 4.33 -0.73 0.67 1.69 -0.84 -0.42 -0.47 -1.10 -0.67 -0.18 0.44 -0.10 1.76 -1.25
Spain 0.06 0.87 -0.31 0.20 -0.37 -0.55 -1.52 -0.36 -1.27 1.91 2.06 -1.57 0.44 -0.44 0.14 3.52 1.18
Sweden -0.12 -0.89 0.85 -1.99 -1.16 2.21 2.44 1.20 -0.08 0.14 -0.76 1.30 3.18 2.11 -0.55 -1.73 0.13
Switzerland -0.61 -0.81 -0.77 0.26 -0.34 -1.34 -3.20 0.12 1.60 -0.78 -0.01 -1.00 -0.52 1.05 2.22 0.97 0.75
Turkey 1.23 0.42 4.82 1.91 -2.32 -1.87 -1.30 0.04 -1.94 -0.66 -1.10 0.37 -0.79 0.62 -1.27 1.37 -2.22
United Kingdom 1.15 0.80 -1.47 -1.51 0.58 0.50 1.97 -0.63 -1.12 0.78 -0.64 0.78 0.89 1.66 0.27 -2.49 0.13
Yugoslavia -0.04 -0.15 - - 2.81 -2.43 - 0.15 0.35 -0.88 -0.18 - -1.52 -1.64 0.83 2.00 -
Table 2: Average bias over the period 1975− 2003 from row country to column country (part 1)
A ‘−’ off the diagonal indicates that countries have never encountered each other in the Eurovision Song Contest.
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Lithu. Luxemb. Maced. Malta Mon. Netherl. Norw. Poland Portugal Romania Russia Slovak. Sloven. Spain Sweden Switzerl. Turkey UK Yug.
Austria -0.39 0.09 -1.23 -0.36 -0.90 0.30 -0.93 3.23 -0.79 -0.41 0.95 -0.78 -0.96 -0.39 0.67 0.66 -0.19 1.90 -1.01
Belgium -0.58 0.17 -1.05 -0.34 -0.56 0.38 1.18 -0.43 -0.81 -1.88 -0.59 -0.63 -1.14 1.10 -0.37 0.86 0.00 0.91 0.68
Bosnia -0.18 -0.48 -1.14 2.07 - 0.66 -1.26 1.36 -1.40 0.19 -2.17 -0.78 3.58 0.15 -0.19 -1.81 1.44 -0.55 -
Croatia -0.18 -0.48 5.92 3.69 - -0.77 -0.57 -1.14 -0.37 0.04 1.31 2.15 3.45 1.01 -3.39 -1.08 0.88 1.63 -
Cyprus 1.36 0.24 0.69 -0.41 - -0.91 -0.20 -1.67 -0.38 0.46 1.82 -0.63 -0.93 2.04 -1.62 -0.23 -1.38 -1.37 3.01
Denmark -0.94 -0.75 -1.23 1.55 4.07 -0.67 0.82 0.47 -0.98 -2.18 -1.46 - -2.37 -1.79 3.54 0.69 -0.81 0.94 1.64
Estonia 0.34 - -1.05 -0.91 - -1.79 1.21 0.44 -1.57 -1.63 3.93 -0.63 -0.32 -1.69 3.44 -0.54 -2.12 0.17 -
Finland -0.27 0.28 -0.70 -3.10 -0.35 -1.00 -0.37 -0.39 -0.44 -1.31 -1.41 -0.63 0.20 0.41 0.66 0.36 -0.17 -0.70 -0.13
France -0.71 0.62 -1.05 -1.39 -2.04 0.55 -1.01 0.68 3.06 0.04 -1.38 -0.63 -0.15 0.23 -1.27 -0.07 1.14 0.36 -1.26
Germany -0.71 -0.45 -1.05 -0.36 0.92 0.59 0.59 3.98 -0.12 -0.59 -0.63 -0.50 -0.73 -0.12 0.65 -0.23 2.16 0.21 -1.67
Greece -0.74 -0.60 -0.92 0.83 -0.37 -0.12 -1.02 0.16 0.51 2.95 0.96 1.81 0.26 2.76 -1.73 -0.40 -0.29 -1.99 -1.42
Hungary 0.00 - -0.70 -2.64 - 1.87 0.73 1.92 0.58 -0.43 0.32 -0.50 0.34 0.26 -0.07 -0.29 -0.36 2.49 -
Iceland -0.41 -0.83 -1.32 -2.17 - -1.00 2.00 -0.59 0.52 -1.55 0.21 -0.78 -0.32 -1.32 1.76 0.63 -1.19 -2.15 3.64
Ireland -0.41 1.32 -1.01 1.65 -0.34 0.71 1.31 -1.27 -0.79 -1.23 -1.01 -0.63 1.07 -1.34 0.16 -0.09 -1.08 -0.54 0.34
Israel 1.50 -0.59 -1.05 -1.50 0.07 2.33 -0.26 -1.29 -0.42 3.34 1.27 -0.35 -1.21 0.71 -0.06 -0.78 -0.13 0.96 2.52
Italy - 0.26 - 1.66 3.05 -0.17 -0.07 -1.30 0.03 - -1.43 - 0.59 1.79 -1.09 0.63 0.50 -0.68 -1.47
Latvia 4.65 - -1.23 1.39 - -1.51 2.28 8.39 -0.65 -1.73 4.93 - -1.71 -1.86 1.37 0.91 -3.28 0.96 -
Lithuania - - -1.14 -2.82 - -0.04 -1.70 -0.41 -1.53 -1.92 3.15 -0.65 2.48 -2.02 -0.55 -0.67 -1.42 1.45 -
Luxembourg - - - 3.08 -0.34 0.54 -0.26 - 1.20 - - - -0.39 0.61 -0.17 0.16 0.22 1.23 -1.03
Macedonia -0.55 - - 0.29 - -2.60 -3.01 -0.83 2.61 6.82 -1.11 -0.35 -0.07 -1.80 -1.10 -0.44 4.57 0.36 -
Malta -0.45 4.71 0.69 - -0.24 0.66 -1.19 -0.62 -1.33 0.88 0.12 6.33 -0.85 0.40 -0.68 -0.17 1.89 0.60 0.25
Monaco - -0.63 - -1.88 - -0.55 0.58 - -0.05 - - - - -1.17 0.02 -1.60 1.44 2.18 -0.96
Netherlands 0.98 -0.10 -1.01 -1.71 -0.14 - 0.76 -0.46 0.46 -1.23 -1.06 -0.63 -0.01 -0.65 -0.64 1.31 0.87 -0.92 -1.02
Norway -0.76 -0.67 -1.01 -0.36 -1.83 -0.81 - 0.16 -0.09 -0.97 0.73 -0.63 -1.03 -1.14 3.05 0.25 -0.60 -0.82 -0.46
Poland -0.76 - -0.70 -0.92 - -0.60 0.14 - -1.27 1.52 0.19 1.11 -0.22 -0.74 0.00 -0.48 -2.59 -0.26 -
Portugal -0.76 1.44 -0.70 -0.64 -0.14 -0.63 -0.30 -0.88 - -1.26 -1.48 -0.63 -0.64 -0.23 -0.52 -0.27 -1.01 0.51 -2.08
Romania -0.27 - 7.66 -0.92 - -2.62 -1.77 3.43 -1.72 - 3.56 -0.50 0.89 1.20 -0.72 0.29 1.89 -0.12 -
Russia 4.15 - 2.43 -0.43 - 1.31 1.16 -1.62 -0.11 5.86 - -0.65 2.04 -0.79 -2.36 0.76 -2.54 -0.28 -
Slovakia 0.00 - 2.43 6.97 - -1.38 -4.06 -1.08 -2.34 -0.43 -3.04 - -0.75 -0.12 -1.65 -0.57 -1.90 -1.05 -
Slovenia -0.25 0.57 1.17 -1.51 - -0.10 1.08 0.03 -1.33 -2.13 2.39 -0.63 - -1.73 0.48 0.62 -0.93 -0.58 -
Spain -0.71 0.06 -1.05 1.00 -0.34 0.37 -1.55 -1.27 2.13 1.50 -1.67 0.06 -0.38 - -1.46 -1.86 0.29 -0.83 -1.19
Sweden -0.45 0.17 -1.05 0.33 2.34 -0.34 1.88 -1.53 0.01 -1.42 -2.27 -0.63 0.20 -1.55 - -1.31 -0.59 0.14 -0.08
Switzerland -0.27 -1.34 -1.05 -0.24 -0.56 0.18 -0.53 -0.36 0.13 -1.31 -2.98 -0.63 -0.78 1.73 0.22 - 0.89 0.44 -1.51
Turkey -0.94 -1.29 -1.05 1.80 -0.98 0.72 -0.51 -0.42 0.73 0.21 -1.62 -0.63 -0.27 1.90 -1.10 -0.33 - 0.28 3.85
UK 0.34 0.39 -1.05 0.33 1.13 -0.30 0.26 -0.36 -0.75 -1.63 -1.37 -0.63 0.08 -1.30 0.90 1.35 0.09 - 0.84
Yugoslavia - 0.01 - 0.20 -1.43 0.34 -0.82 - -0.27 - - - - -0.87 0.08 0.73 2.58 -0.91 -
Table 3: Average bias over the period 1975− 2003 from row country to column country (part 2)
A ‘−’ off the diagonal indicates that countries have never encountered each other in the Eurovision Song Contest.
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jury song average bias average bias
country country before 1998 after 1998
Austria Turkey 0.8 1.4
Belgium Turkey 0.9 3.0
Denmark Turkey 0.5 1.0
France Turkey 0.0 4.6
Germany Turkey 0.8 6.4
Netherlands Turkey 0.2 3.1
Sweden Turkey 1.0 0.0
Switzerland Turkey 2.3 1.7
United Kingdom Turkey 0.5 -1.3
Turkey Austria 2.7 3.2
Turkey Belgium 2.5 3.6
Turkey Denmark 1.1 1.5
Turkey France -2.0 -1.7
Turkey Germany -0.8 -0.4
Turkey Netherlands 0.9 0.2
Turkey Sweden -0.3 -0.4
Turkey Switzerland 3.3 0.0
Turkey United Kingdom -0.1 1.4
Table 4: Average biases before and after the introduction of televoting
This table shows the average biases of several countries with a considerable
population with Turkish roots, calculated over the periods before and after
televoting was fully introduced (i.e. before and after 1998). The average biases of
Turkey to the same countries are also displayed.
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% total % victories
language
English 23.8 48.3
French 12.3 13.8
other 63.9 37.9
performance
group 25.4 41.4
duet 8.0 3.4
male 24.0 10.3
female 42.6 44.8
order
first 4.7 10.3
second 4.7 0.0
third 4.7 3.4
8th 4.7 6.9
13th 4.7 6.9
14th 4.7 10.3
last 4.7 13.8
host country
song sung by 4.7 10.3
host country
Table 5: Song properties and percentage of victories
This table displays the percentage of songs in the period 1975− 2003 with a
certain property, and the percentage of victories with that property. The
percentage of 4.7 (e.g. the percentage of songs that performed first) is obtained as
the number of years in the sample (= 29) divided by the total number of songs
over these years (= 623).
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geography
xeastij longitudinal distance between capitals of i and j, if j located to the east of i; zero otherwise
xwestij longitudinal distance between capitals of i and j, if j located to the west of i; zero otherwise
ynorthij latitudinal distance between capitals of i and j, if j located to the north of i; zero otherwise
ysouthij latitudinal distance between capitals of i and j, if j located to the south of i; zero otherwise
neighbij one if countries i and j are neighbours, zero otherwise
language
langtij distance between language(s) of i and (song of) j in year t
performance
maletj one if song of j in year t was sung by male solo singer, zero otherwise
duettj one if song of j in year t was sung by male-female duet, zero otherwise
grouptj one if song of j in year t was performed by a group, zero otherwise
englishtj one if song of j in year t was sung in English, zero otherwise
frenchtj one if song of j in year t was sung in French, zero otherwise
hosttj one if country j was the host in year t, zero otherwise
ordertj order of song of j in year t (1 is first song that was sung)
cultural dimensions
pdiij distance between power distance index of countries i and j
idvij distance between individualism index of i and j
masij distance between masculinity index of i and j
uaiij distance between uncertainty avoidance index of i and j
religion
relij one if countries i and j share at least one major religion, zero otherwise
ethnicity
turkpopi one if country i has a substantial population with Turkish roots, zero otherwise
Table 6: Potential determinants of voting bias
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xeast xwest ynorth ysouth neighb lang
Austria -0.15 -0.17
(-2.41) (-2.88)
Belgium
Bosnia -0.16 -0.11
(-2.54) (-2.94)
Croatia -2.60
(-2.12)
Cyprus -7.32
(-6.75)
Denmark -2.90
(-3.81)
Estonia -0.10 -0.11 3.79
(-4.37) (-3.74) (3.84)
Finland -0.45
(-2.81)
France
Germany -0.08 -0.11 0.07
(-2.00) (-2.49) (2.56)
Greece -7.44
(-4.85)
Hungary -0.29
(-1.96)
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Latvia 3.76
(2.39)
Lithuania 3.77
(2.12)
Luxembourg 0.17
(2.45)
Macedonia -0.21 -0.30 -3.32
(-2.33) (-2.41) (-2.03)
Malta 3.25
(2.16)
Monaco
Netherlands
Norway -1.54
(-2.03)
Poland
Portugal 0.06 -2.53
(2.27) (-2.58)
Romania
Russia
Slovakia 0.52 -0.14 -0.29 2.45
(2.86) (-3.38) (-3.26) (2.52)
Slovenia 2.45 -3.89
(2.82) (-2.85)
Spain -2.81
(-2.92)
Sweden 0.06
(2.33)
Switzerland 0.11 1.51 2.00
(2.28) (2.54) (2.54)
Turkey -0.30 -0.07 0.03
(-3.30) (-2.36) (1.98)
United Kingdom 0.06 0.12 -2.14
(2.65) (3.47) (-2.83)
Yugoslavia
equal slopes -0.024 -0.045 0.014 -1.04
(entire period) (-4.02) (-7.37) (3.82) (-7.42)
equal slopes -0.028 -0.044 0.017 -0.32 -1.09
(no televoting) (-3.68) (-5.91) (3.94) (-2.40) (6.66)
equal slopes -0.045 1.55 -1.66
(televoting) (-4.30) (5.99) (5.56)
Table 7: Estimation results for fixed-effects models (1)
Tables 7, 8, and 9 display the estimation results for the country-specific model in equation (5.5), apart from the last rows.
These rows show the estimation results for the fixed-effects model in equation (5.4) with equal slopes across all countries
(but possibly different intercepts). The tables only report coefficients that are significant at at least a 5% significance level.
The t-values in parentheses are robust for heteroskedasticity and period autocorrelation and have been obtained from the
Newest-West covariance matrix. Coefficients not in bold face are significant at a 5% confidence level; those in bold face are
significant at a 1% level. Country-specific intercepts are not displayed.
male duet group english french host order
Austria
Belgium -1.38
(-2.23)
Bosnia
Croatia -2.38 -1.38
(-2.97) (-2.03)
Cyprus -0.96
(-2.05)
Denmark 1.08 0.88
(2.96) (2.90)
Estonia 1.34
(2.60)
Finland
France -1.30
(-3.62)
Germany
Greece 0.97 -1.64
(2.61) (-2.16)
Hungary 1.48
(2.20)
Iceland -0.91
(-2.52)
Ireland 1.14
(2.03)
Israel -0.67
(-2.02)
Italy -0.92 -2.07
(-2.05) (-3.27)
Latvia 2.47 1.37
(2.79) (2.07)
Lithuania -2.25 2.01 1.78
(-2.77) (3.24) (1.96)
Luxembourg
Macedonia 4.52
(3.94)
Malta 2.67
(2.69)
Monaco
Netherlands -0.78 -1.27 -0.67 1.50
(-2.51) (-2.50) (-2.06) (2.55)
Norway
Poland 2.51
(4.27)
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovakia 2.47 -5.61
(2.04) (-5.67)
Slovenia 1.33 -0.79
(2.39) (-2.05)
Spain -2.34
(-3.63)
Sweden 0.94
(2.48)
Switzerland -0.64 1.10 -1.62
(-2.13) (2.75) (-2.68)
Turkey -2.28
(-4.34)
United Kingdom 0.94
(1.96)
Yugoslavia
equal slopes -0.23
(entire period) (-2.48)
equal slopes
(no televoting)
equal slopes
(televoting)
Table 8: Estimation results for fixed-effects models (2)
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pdi idv mas uai rel R2 adj. R2 # obs
Austria -0.017 0.050 0.017 532
(-2.06)
Belgium 0.023 0.052 0.019 526
(2.16)
Bosnia -0.055 -1.61 0.151 0.069 207
(-2.23) (-2.22)
Croatia 0.235 0.176 254
Cyprus 1.71 0.286 0.258 448
(2.10)
Denmark 0.189 0.155 450
Estonia -0.060 0.031 0.380 0.325 208
(-3.31) (2.28)
Finland 0.040 0.004 482
France 0.061 0.031 579
Germany -0.039 0.015 0.033 0.002 574
(-2.30) (1.98)
Greece 0.233 0.203 479
Hungary 0.146 -0.045 94
Iceland -0.048 -0.017 0.041 1.64 0.163 0.126 352
(-2.14) (-2.03) (2.99) (2.38)
Ireland -0.026 1.21 0.058 0.026 554
(-2.00) (2.29)
Israel 0.029 0.003 491
Italy -0.031 0.098 0.047 335
(-2.16)
Latvia 2.27 0.412 0.267 92
(3.02)
Lithuania 0.330 0.162 91
Luxembourg 0.047 -0.002 366
Macedonia 0.361 0.136 70
Malta 0.070 0.020 315
Monaco 0.107 -0.122 89
Netherlands -0.019 0.074 0.040 512
(-2.11)
Norway -0.033 -0.018 0.029 0.091 0.062 573
(-2.03) (-2.24) (2.45)
Poland -0.046 0.240 0.157 184
(-2.12)
Portugal 0.053 0.092 0.061 550
(3.77)
Romania 0.183 0.034 118
Russia 0.054 -0.058 162
Slovakia 0.516 0.345 70
Slovenia -0.026 0.202 0.125 207
(-2.08)
Spain -0.024 0.078 0.050 596
(-1.96)
Sweden 0.142 0.114 579
Switzerland -0.066 0.099 0.066 506
(-3.55)
Turkey -0.040 0.129 0.100 520
(-3.25)
United Kingdom -0.039 1.11 0.076 0.047 596
(-3.16) (1.97)
Yugoslavia -0.038 0.077 0.104 0.040 253
(-2.06) (2.04)
equal slopes -0.006 -0.005 0.193 0.026 0.022 13,014
(entire period) (-3.12) (-3.01) (2.47)
equal slopes -0.006 -0.004 0.022 0.017 9,698
(no televoting) (-2.52) (-2.14)
equal slopes -0.010 -0.008 0.57 0.094 0.080 3,316
(televoting) (-3.22) (-2.26) (4.20)
Table 9: Estimation results for fixed-effects models (3)
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